The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we generalize Kajii et al. (2007) and provide a condition under which for a game v, its Möbius inverse is equal to zero within the framework of the k-modularity of v for k ≥ 2. This condition is more general than that in Kajii et al. (2007) . Second, we provide a condition under which for a game v, its Möbius inverse takes non-negative values, and not just zero. This paper relates the study of totally monotone games to that of k-monotone games. Furthermore, this paper shows that the modularity of a game is related to k-additive capacities proposed by Grabisch (1997) . To illustrate its application in the field of economics, we use these results to characterize a Gini index representation of Ben-Porath and Gilboa (1994) . Our results can also be applied to potential functions proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and further analyzed by Ui et al. (2011) . JEL Classification Numbers: C71; D81; D90
Introduction
In cooperative game theory and decision theory, functions on some domains play important roles. For a set Ω = {1, . . . , n} and the power set 2 Ω of Ω, in cooperative game theory, Ω denotes a set of players, 2 Ω is interpreted as the collection of all coalitions, and a function v : 2 Ω → R with v(∅) = 0 is a transferable utility game or a game. On the other hand, in decision theory, Ω denotes a set of states of the world, 2 Ω is interpreted as the collection of all events, and v : 2 Ω → R with v(∅) = 0 represents a decision maker's beliefs.
In cooperative game theory and decision theory, it has been recognized that studies into the kinds of properties such a function v has are important. The purpose of this paper is to further investigate two properties of v: modularity and monotonicity.
In economics and statistics, a decision maker's beliefs are usually captured by a probability measure when she is faced with "uncertain situations." However, researchers in these fields are doubtful about the validity of this approach. 1 Shafer (1976) defines a belief function by a totally monotone game and shows that a game v is totally monotone if and only if its Möbius inverse is non-negative (see Section 2 for definitions). 2 Focusing on the notion of v's k-monotonicity, that is, a restricted notion of totally monotone games, Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989) analyze the relationship between v's k-monotonicity and its Möbius inverse and provide some characterization of k-monotone games through the Möbius inverse. One of the purposes of this paper is to investigate properties that link the study of totally monotone games to that of k-monotone games. Kajii et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between the modularity of a game and its Möbius inverse. They show that a game v is modular for some collection of subsets of a state space if and only if its Möbius inverse β T is equal to zero for all T that is not E-complete, where E denotes a collection of events. 3 However, two problems remain to be solved. First, contrary to Kajii et al. (2007) in which the cases of 2-modularity are analyzed, can these results be generalized into the results of k-modularity for k ≥ 2?
Second, contrary to the case in which v's modularity is characterized by its Möbius inverse with the value being zero, can we provide a condition under which for a game v, for k ≥ 2, its Möbius inverse takes non-negative values and not just zero? This task is important since such a condition enables us to characterize some class of totally monotone games by the modularity of a game v. Furthermore, the analyses of the modularity of a game 1 In statistics, to appropriately model uncertain situations, Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976) propose a belief function to overcome shortcomings in the approach to evaluating uncertain situations by a probability measure. To analyze uncertain situations from the point of view of economics, Schmeidler (1989) axiomatizes behaviors of a rational decision maker (the Choquet expected utility). 2 For analyses of totally monotone games, see, for example, Chateauneuf and Rébillé (2004) that show the well-known Yosida-Hewitt (1952)'s decomposition theorem for totally monotone games on the set of all subsets of Ω. 3 The definitions of v's modularity and E -completeness are provided in Section 3.
are also important since they enable us to relate the Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) to potential functions (Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the definitions and well-known results about the modularity of a game and its Möbius inverse. Section 3 presents the definitions and results provided by Kajii et al. (2007) . Section 4 generalizes Kajii et al. (2007) , and provides a condition under which for a game v, its Möbius inverse is equal to zero within the framework of the k-modularity of v for k ≥ 2. By introducing the notion of being k-simple, Section 5 characterizes some class of totally monotone games by the k-modularity and the k-monotonicity of a game v. That is, Section 5 provides a condition under which for a game v, its Möbius inverse takes non-negative values, and not just zero. Section 6 applies our results to previously studied cases. Section 7 concludes.
Modularity and the Möbius Inverse
In this section, we provide definitions and well-known results about the modularity of a game and its Möbius inverse. Let Ω = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of states of the world, whose generic element is denoted by ω. A subset E ⊆ Ω is called an event. Denote by F the collection of all non-empty subsets of Ω, and by F k the collection of subsets with k elements. For example, F 1 denotes the set of all singleton subsets of Ω, that is, 
where |I| denotes the cardinality of I.
• v is totally monotone if it is monotone and k-monotone for all k ≥ 2. 4 v is called a belief function if it is totally monotone and v(Ω) = 1.
•
For T ∈ F, let a game u T be the unanimity game on T defined by the following rule: 
Lemma 1. A game v is additive if and only if its Möbius inverse β
Proof. This follows from the uniqueness of the Möbius inverse.
A totally monotone game v can be characterized by the coefficients β T for all T ∈ F.
Proposition 1 (Shafer (1976)). For any game v, v = T ∈F β T u T is totally monotone if and only if β T is non-negative for all T ∈ F.
By Proposition 1, we obtain the following corollary. 
4 In the literature, the monotonicity of v is often omitted.
Corollary 1 states that the class of totally monotone games is a finite convex cone spanned by unanimity games. Our paper characterizes games spanned by a subclass of unanimity games. 5 Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989) study the relationship between the inclusion-exclusion formula for a game v and its Möbius inverse. (1989) ). Let v = T ∈F β T u T be a game, and let k be an integer satisfying k ≥ 2. Then,
Proposition 2 (Chateauneuf and Jaffray
If a game v is additive, then the right-hand-side of the equation in Proposition 2 is zero.
However, if not, even the sign is not necessarily determined. Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989) also clarify the relationship between v's monotonicity and its Möbius inverse.
Proposition 3 (Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989)). Let
and let k be an integer satisfying k ≥ 2. Then, the following two statements are equivalent.
(ii) A⊆T ⊆B β T ≥ 0 for every A ∈ 2 Ω with 2 ≤ |A| ≤ k and every B ∈ 2 Ω .
Complete Collections and the Möbius Inverse
Before we provide generalizations of Kajii et al. (2007) 
(E). A collection E ⊆ F is said to be complete if all E-complete subsets belong to E, that is, E = Υ(E).
Note that a singleton set is E-complete, and so is any E ∈ E. 6 To relate the modularity of a game to the notion of being E-complete, Kajii et al. (2007) introduce the following definition.
The following lemma in Kajii et al. (2007) clarifies the relationship between the notion of being E-decomposable and the notion of being E-complete.
Lemma 2. An event T ∈ F is not E-complete if and only if T is E-decomposable.
If a game v = T ∈F β T u T is modular, then β T = 0 for all T ∈ F with |T | ≥ 2 by Lemma 1. By restricting the domain on which v is modular, Kajii et al. (2007) propose the notion of being modular for E-decomposition pairs.
Definition 3. Let E ⊆ F be a collection of events, and let
for every E-decomposable set T and every E-decomposition pair {T 1 , T 2 } for such a T .
The modularity for E-decomposition pairs and the collection of subsets T with β T = 0 can be related by the following theorem. One of the purposes of this paper is to extend this theorem. Section 4 provides the extension.
Theorem 1 (Kajii et al. (2007)). Let E ⊆ F be a collection of events. Let v = T ∈F β T u T be a game. The following statements are equivalent: (i) v is modular for E-decomposition pairs; (ii) β T = 0 for any T that is not E-complete, that is, T /
∈ Υ(E).
A Generalization of Kajii et al. (2007)
This section provides a condition under which for a game v, its Möbius inverse is equal to zero within the framework of the k-modularity of v for k ≥ 2 that is more general than that of Kajii et al. (2007) . This task is accomplished by generalizing E-completeness into 
Example 1. Every singleton set is E-complete of order
m for all m. That is, F 1 ⊆ Υ m (E).
Example 2. Any set T ∈ E is E-complete of order m for all m. That is, E ⊆ Υ m (E).
Example 3. Let Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let E = F 2 . Then, {1, 2, 3} is E-complete of order 2 since {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3} ∈ E. However, {1, 2, 3} is not E-complete of order 3, since there is
Note that for m = 2, the notion of being E-complete of order m coincides with that of being E-complete. Therefore, the idea of E-completeness of order m is a generalization of the idea of E-completeness in Kajii et al. (2007) . Next, we introduce the notion of k-set's E-decomposition.
if it satisfies the following two conditions: 
As such, we can also define decompositions by corresponding to each S / ∈ Υ m (E) as follows.
Definition 6. Let E ⊆ F be a collection of events, and let m ≥ 2 be an integer. A collection {W k m (E)} 2≤k≤m is said to be an E-decomposition collection with respect to Υ m (E) if it satisfies the following conditions:
, there exist a unique k with 2 ≤ k ≤ m and a unique collection
and
We can easily show that all of our results for {W k (E)} 2≤k≤m hold for {W k m (E)} 2≤k≤m , which enables us to reduce the number of decompositions. Therefore, the notion of E-decomposition collections with respect to Υ m (E) reduces the number of equations that should be analyzed.
To relate a game v's modularity for k-set's E-decompositions to the Möbius inverse, we define the modularity that is restricted to the collection of k-set's E-decompositions.
Definition 7.
Let k ≥ 2 be an integer and E ⊆ F. A game v is said to be k-modular for k-
Similarly, we define the modularity for E-decomposition collections with respect to
To prove Theorem 2, the following proposition is in order. The idea of the proof is based on Kojima and Ui (2007).
Proposition 4. Fix a game v, a collection E ⊆ F, and an integer m. The following three
statements about a game w = T ∈F γ T u T are equivalent:
(ii) {γ T } T ∈F is determined recursively by the following rule:
For T ∈ F with
(iii) w satisfies the following two conditions:
there is no E ∈ E such that {ω 1 , . . . , ω k } ⊆ E ⊆ T , since there is no E ∈ E such that {ω 1 , . . . , ω k } ⊆ E ⊆ S. Thus, T ∈ Υ m (E) and γ T = 0 by (ii). Therefore, by Proposition 2,
Suppose that w satisfies the conditions in (iii). To prove that (iii) implies (ii), it suffices to show that w is uniquely determined because the unique game that satisfies the conditions in (ii) satisfies the conditions in (iii). To show this uniqueness, we construct w recursively such that in the h-th step, we determine the unique value of w(S) with |S| = h from w(S ) with |S | ≤ h − 1. Start with w(∅) = 0. Consider the h-th step with h ≥ 1 and pick any S with |S| = h.
Since the terms on the right-hand side are uniquely calculated in the earlier steps, so is w(S) on the left-hand side. By this procedure, we can uniquely determine w recursively, which establishes its uniqueness.
The following result is an immediate consequence of the above proposition.
Theorem 2. Let m ≥ 2 be an integer, v =
T ∈F β T u T be a game and E ⊆ F. The following two conditions are equivalent:
This theorem states that by a game v's k-modularity, we can characterize its Möbius inverse that is equal to zero within a more general framework than that of Kajii et al. 
Proof. Clearly, Proposition 4 holds for {W
This corollary states that the Möbius inverses such that β T = 0 for all T / ∈ Υ(E) are determined by at most 2 n − 1 − |Υ m (E)| equations that are less than those in Kajii et al.
(2007). Applying Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 to E = ∪ k i=2 F i gives the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let k ≥ 2 be an integer, |Ω| ≥ k + 1, and v = T ∈F β T u T . Define a collection of decompositions, all of which consist of (k + 1) sets by
Then, the following three conditions for v are equivalent:
Thus, S ∈ Υ k+1 (E) if and only if |S| ≥ k + 1. Conditions (1) and (3) are equivalent since it follows from Theorem 2 that
On the other hand, Conditions (2) and (3) are equivalent since it follows from Corollary 2 that {W
Note that in Condition (2), we use the term "(k + 1)-modular" instead of "at most (k + 1)-modular."
Characterization of Totally Monotone Games
This section derives a condition under which for a game v = T ∈F β T u T , its Möbius inverse takes non-negative values, and not just zero.
Definition 9. A collection E ⊆ F is said to be k-simple if, for every S with |S| ≥ 2, there exists T satisfying both T ⊆ S and 2 ≤ |T | ≤ k such that there exists no E ∈ E with
T ⊆ E S. Equivalently, for all S ∈ F with |S| ≥ 2, if S ∈ Υ k (E), then S ∈ Υ k (E\S).
Example 5.
Any partition of Ω is k-simple for all k ≥ 2, and so is {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, . . . , {n−
1, n}}.
We need the following lemma to show Corollary 5.
Lemma 3. For all
k ≥ 2, the collection ∪ k i=2 F i is (k + 1)-simple. Proof. Let E = ∪ k i=2 F i for k ≥ 2
. Pick any S with 2 ≤ |S|. If |S| ≤ k, then replace T in Definition 9 with S itself, which shows that there is no E ∈ E such that T ⊆ E S.
When k + 1 ≤ |S|, choose any T satisfying both T ⊆ S and |T | = k + 1. Then, such a T satisfies the following: there is no E ∈ E such that T ⊆ E S, since E ∈ E implies that |E| ≤ k. Thus, E must be (k + 1)-simple.
Note that if E is k-simple, then any E ⊆ E is k-simple. This fact considered together
with Example 5 and Lemma 3 yields that the class of being k-simple is not so small.
The following lemma states that the notion of being k-simple involves the same property as completeness.
Lemma 4. Let E ⊆ F be k-simple. Then, for S with |S| ≥ 2, S ∈ E if and only if S is E-complete of order k. That is, E ∪ F 1 = Υ k (E).
Proof. By Examples 1 and 2, E ∪ F 1 ⊆ Υ k (E). Then, suppose that S / ∈ E and |S| ≥ 2.
Since E is k-simple, there exists T ⊆ S with 2 ≤ |T | ≤ k such that there exists no E ∈ E with T ⊆ E S. This means that there exists no E ∈ E with T ⊆ E ⊆ S, since S / ∈ E, which shows that S is not E-complete of order k. Thus, E ∪ F 1 = Υ k (E). Now, we are in a position to provide our main result in this section. Note that the converse is also true. Theorem 3 states that when E is m-simple, totally monotone games can be characterized by m-monotone games in addition to the k-modularity for k-set's E-decompositions for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m.
Theorem 3. Let v = T ∈F β T u T be a non-negative game, and let m be an integer sat-
isfying m ≥ 2. Let E ⊆ F be m-simple. Let v be k-modular for k-set's E-decompositions for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, if v is m-monotone, v is totally monotone. Proof. Suppose that v = T ∈F β T u T is m-monotone. Since v is k-modular for k-set's E- decompositions for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m, it
Corollary 4. Let E ⊆ F be 2-simple. For a non-negative game v ∈ R F , suppose that v is modular for E-decomposition pairs (that is, 2-modular for 2-set's E-decompositions). If v is convex (that is, 2-monotone), then v is totally monotone.
Note that the converse is also true. From the viewpoint of economics, this corollary is important because two decision models under uncertainty, that is, the E-capacity expected utility model of Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) and the multiperiod decision model of Gilboa (1989) , can be characterized by this corollary. 7
7 Let Ω = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of states, and let E ⊆ F be a collection of events. For the E-capacity expected utility model (Eichberger and Kelsey (1999)), we can generalize the collection E into a 2-simple collection that is more general than Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) and Kajii et al. (2007) . In the former study, the collection E = {E1, . . . , En} is supposed to be a partition of Ω with |Ei| ≥ 2 for each i, and in the latter study, to be a collection of non-empty, disjoint subsets of Ω with |Ei| ≥ 2 for each i. For a multiperiod decision model (Gilboa (1989) ), let E = {{i, i + 1}|1 ≤ i < n}. Then, E is the collection of adjacent time periods, and this collection E is 2-simple.
Corollary 5. If v : 2 Ω → R is non-negative, 3-modular for 3-set's F 2 -decompositions and 2-monotone, then v
Proof. This corollary is proved in the same way as Theorem 3 by setting E = ∪ k i=2 F i . By Corollary 3, it holds that β T = 0 for every T with |T | ≥ k + 1. Thus, it suffices to show that β S ≥ 0 for every S with |S| ≤ k. This is shown by setting F = S for F ⊆X⊆S β X ≥ 0 in the proof of Theorem 3 since v is k-monotone.
Applications
This section compares our results with previous results, and applies our results to previously studied cases. In Subsection 6.1, we discuss the relationship between Fujimoto and Murofushi (1997) and our paper. In Subsection 6.2, we discuss the relationship between kadditive measures (or k-additive capacities) in Grabisch (1997) 
Inclusion-Exclusion Covering
One of the most relevant papers is Fujimoto and Murofushi (1997) . First, we present the notion of the inclusion-exclusion covering proposed by Sugeno et al. (1995) that is further analyzed by Murofushi et al. (1997) and Fujimoto and Murofushi (1997) .
Definition 10. Let Ω = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set, and let v be a game. A covering 
Thus, the notion of IEC reduces the complexity of identification of Choquet integrals. To relate Fujimoto and Murofushi (1997) with our paper, the following lemma is in order.
Proof. Assume that |T | > 1. Suppose that T / ∈ E and T is E-complete of order (k + 1).
There is at least one S such that S ⊆ T and S ∈ E since T is E-complete of order (k + 1).
This S satisfies S = T since T / ∈ E.
T is E-complete of order k + 1. However, E ∈ E and |S * | < |E|. This contradicts the assumption of maximality of S * .
Lemma 5 together with Theorem 2 leads to the following result.
This proposition states that Theorem 2 can provide the same result as Fujimoto and Murofushi (1997) with respect to T such that β T = 0 whenever T ⊆ C i for every C i ∈ C where collection C satisfies the condition in Proposition 6. On the other hand, many examples can be obtained from our results, but not from Fujimoto and Murofushi (1997) .
One of the examples is as follows. 4 , ω 5 , ω 6 }, and let E 1 = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }, and E 2 = {ω 4 , ω 5 , ω 6 }. Moreover, let E = {E 1, E 2 }. Since Υ 2 (E) = E ∪ F 1 , the following two conditions for a game v = T ∈F β T u T are equivalent by Theorem 2: (i) v is 2-modular for 2-set's E-decomposition; (ii) β T = 0 whenever T = E 1 , T = E 2 , and T / ∈ F 1 . It is impossible to induce Condition (ii) by Fujimoto and Murofushi (1997) .
The number of equations in (i) of Proposition 6 may be more than that in Fujimoto and Murofushi (1997) that is exactly |F| = 2 n − 1. However, by using Corollary 2 instead of Theorem 2, we can reduce the number of equations to 2 n − 1 − |E ∪ F 1 |. Our result enables us to identify a capacity v and the Choquet integral through its Möbius inverse relatively easily.
k-Additive Capacities and the Gini Index
Grabisch (1997) proposes the notion of k-additive measures (or k-additive capacities) to decrease the complexity of capacities in applications since a capacity defined on a set Ω with n elements requires the identification of 2 n − 1 real coefficients. Grabisch (2000) extends Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989) that analyze the set of probability measures dominating a given capacity, and he then analyzes the set of k-additive measures dominating a given capacity. 8 First, the definition of k-additive measures is provided. Gini index. 10 In both these studies, policymakers' beliefs are captured by symmetric capacities. 11 From the viewpoint of economics, it is reasonable to assume that policymakers' beliefs are captured by symmetric capacities since the symmetricity of capacities can be interpreted as necessitating policymakers to be impartial. However, our results in this subsection do not necessarily require the symmetricity of capacities. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994) provide the relationship between the Choquet integral and the Möbius inverse.
Theorem 4 (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994)).
For all x ∈ R Ω and a capacity v = 
where 0 < δ < 1/(n − 1) is a constant. This representation means that a Gini preference can be represented by a linear combination of total income and the Gini index. Given
This representation can be generalized by our results in previous sections. In this regard, let us define the following operator I for an income profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ):
where β i ≥ 0 and β {i,j} ≥ 0 are some constant numbers. We call this form the generalized Ben-Porath-Gilboa representation. Then, our main results in Section 4 prove the following. (ii) There exists a non-negative convex game v that is 3-modular for 3-set's F 2 -decompositions such that I(f ) = f dv. 10 Gajdos (2002) calls it a P-Gini index. See also Section 5 in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994) . 11 A game v : 2 Ω → R is a symmetric capacity if it is a capacity and v(E) = v(F ) for any E, F ∈ 2 Ω with |E| = |F |. Gajdos (2002) shows that if a symmetric capacity is at most k-additive, then it is expressed by a polynomial of degree at most k. Corollary 2 in this paper leads to the same result in Gajdos (2002) for symmetric capacities.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let I be the generalized Ben-Porath-Gilboa representation defined by Note that v in this proposition is a 2-additive capacity. This proposition states that the generalized Ben-Porath-Gilboa representation can be characterized by 2-additive capacities. A decision maker's beliefs are not necessarily restricted to symmetric capacities, whereas her beliefs are captured by symmetric capacities in Ben-Porath and and Gajdos (2002).
Potential Functions
In this subsection, we apply our results to cooperative games and extend Ui et al. (2011) . By G we denote the class of all games. 12 A subset S of N is a coalition, and 2 N denotes the set of all coalitions. The Shapley value for the player i ∈ N is defined by
where v(S) − v(S\{i}) is the marginal contribution of a player i in a coalition S. 13 It is shown that the Shapley value of (N, v) with v = T ∈2 N β T u T can be represented as follows: 
2.5), 15 who shows that a function f is equal to the Shapley value if and only if it satisfies efficiency, the null player property, and fairness. 16 First, it is shown that the Shapley value satisfies the three conditions. Second, it is shown that a solution f satisfying the three conditions must be uniquely constructed from the three conditions in a recursive way, based on some geometric property. 
Proof. Note that if H ∈ CCS

Conclusion
This paper analyzed two problems that remained to be solved in Kajii et al. (2007) . Our results for modularity are closely related to the results in the literature on nonadditive measure theory. The modularity of a game can be related to the inclusionexclusion covering proposed by Sugeno et al. (1995) and also to a k-additive capacity proposed by Grabisch (1997) . Furthermore, we provided interpretations of our results by applying them to existing problems in economics. We showed that a Gini index representation axiomatized by Ben-Porath and is characterized by the Choquet integrals satisfying some conditions. The Gini index representation cannot be obtained within the framework of Kajii et al. (2007) . An application of our results to potential 15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee who pointed out that our proof of Proposition 8 in this paper is similar to that of van den Brink (2001, Theorem 2.5). 16 The study by van den Brink (2001) proposes fairness. This property states that if to a game v we add a game w where players i and j are symmetric, then the payoffs of players i and j change by the same amount. That is, if i, j ∈ N are symmetric players in a game w, then fi(v + w) − fi(v) = fj (v + w) − fj(v) for any game v.
